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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioners’ lawsuit is an attempt to force Facebook—a social media 
platform with over two billion users—to remove critical content posted by 
third parties about fatal traffic accidents involving individuals driving vans 
emblazoned with the name and logo of country rap artist Petitioner Jason 
Cross a/k/a Mikel Knight. The Court of Appeal recognized the lack of merit 
in Petitioners’ claims and issued a thorough and well-reasoned opinion 
based on three long-established and uncontroversial principles:  
1. California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to lawsuits that challenge an 
internet service provider’s constitutionally protected right to make 
editorial decisions concerning third-party content on a public issue; 
2. Claims that attempt to hold an internet service provider liable as the 
“publisher or speaker” of third-party content are barred by the 
federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230; 
and  
3. Right of publicity claims, both common law and statutory, require a 
“use”—by the defendant—of an individual’s name or likeness.  
Petitioners do not challenge any of these legal principles, or any of 
the Court of Appeal’s findings in this action. Instead, while conceding that 
Facebook did not create the critical pages or posts and that Facebook did 
not use Knight’s name or likeness in any advertisement, Petitioners repeat 
their same failed arguments that Facebook’s Terms and Community 
Standards obligated Facebook to remove content they do not like, and that 
Facebook violated Knight’s right of publicity when third parties mentioned 
his name or used his likeness in their critical commentary and posts on 
Facebook. 
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Petitioners’ disagreement with the Court of Appeal’s resolution of 
their claims is not a sufficient basis for this Court’s review, and in any 
event, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that the gravamen of the 
Complaint is Knight’s objection to the third-party content and Facebook’s 
editorial decisions not to remove that content. Petitioners thus cannot 
demonstrate that this Court’s review is necessary to secure uniformity of 
decision or settle an important question of law under Rule of Court 
8.500(b)(1). 
In an effort to secure this Court’s review of their failed claims, 
Petitioners misconstrue both the speech and advertising practices at issue. 
But the Court of Appeal properly rejected those efforts. With regard to the 
former, the Court dismissed Petitioners’ arguments as contrary to the 
allegations in the Complaint. As to the latter, while the Petition argues that 
this case raises important issues involving Facebook’s advertising services, 
no such issues were raised below. To the contrary, the Court of Appeal was 
asked to answer a simple question: whether Facebook “used” Knight’s 
name or likeness in violation of his right of publicity by serving unrelated 
third-party advertisements adjacent to the allegedly objectionable content, 
created by different third parties, using Knight’s name or likeness. 
Applying well-settled case law, the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioners’ 
invitation to adopt this nonsensical and boundless definition of “use” in the 
right of publicity context, and recognized that doing so would render ad-
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supported, free Internet services like Facebook unviable. This Court need 
not revisit this routine and unsurprising decision of the Court of Appeal.  
Because Petitioners have failed to carry their burden to establish that 
review by this Court is necessary or warranted, the Petition for Review 
should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background 
Facebook operates a free social networking service that enables two 
billion users worldwide and millions of Californians to stay connected with 
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share 
and express what matters to them. Use of this free service is subject to 
Facebook’s Terms of Service, referred to as Facebook’s Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities (“Terms”). (1 AA 55 ¶ 3.) Facebook users 
agree to the Terms when they sign up for a Facebook account and each time 
they access or use Facebook. (Ibid.)  
The Terms provide that Facebook has the discretion, but not the 
obligation, to remove content that violates Facebook policies. (1 AA 59 § 
5.2 [“We can remove any content or information you post on Facebook if 
we believe that it violates this Statement or our policies.”].) They also make 
clear that Facebook is not responsible for “the content or information users 
transmit or share on Facebook,” for “any offensive, inappropriate, obscene, 
unlawful or otherwise objectionable content or information you may 
encounter on Facebook,” or for “the conduct, whether online or offline, of 
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any user of Facebook.” (1 AA 60 § 15.2; see also 1 AA 59 § 3 [“We do our 
best to keep Facebook safe, but we cannot guarantee it.”].) 
Facebook’s Community Standards provide further guidance to users 
about what kind of content they can share on Facebook and the types of 
discretionary actions Facebook may take with regard to content posted by 
others. (1 AA 63-66.) Like the Terms, the Community Standards provide 
that while Facebook may remove user content, it will not always remove 
content that a particular user might find objectionable. (1 AA 63 [“[P]lease 
keep in mind that something that may be disagreeable and disturbing to you 
may not violate our Community Standards.”], [“We remove credible threats 
of physical harm to individuals…. We may consider things like a person’s 
physical location or public visibility in determining whether a threat is 
credible”]; 1 AA 65 [“Reporting something doesn’t guarantee that it will be 
removed because it may not violate [Facebook’s] policies.”], [“Our review 
decisions may occasionally change after receiving additional context about 
specific posts or after seeing new, violating content appearing on a Page or 
Facebook Profile.”].) 
B. Procedural Background 
1. Petitioners sued Facebook for not removing third-party 
content critical of Knight 
 Petitioner Knight is a public figure who describes himself as a 
professional “Country Rap” recording artist. (1 AA 9 ¶ 6.) Petitioner 1203 
Entertainment, LLC is Knight’s record label. (1 AA 10 ¶7.) Petitioner 
 10   
MDRST Marketing/Promotions, LLC, 1203 Entertainment’s subsidiary, 
hired independent contractors to travel across the country in vans featuring 
Knight’s name and logo, promoting and selling Knight’s music and 
merchandise to the public. (Ibid.) 
 In June 2014, two of these vans were involved in separate accidents 
when their drivers fell asleep at the wheel. (1 AA 10 ¶¶ 8-9.) The accidents 
killed two people and seriously injured another. (Ibid.) Shortly after the 
accidents, a publicly available Facebook page called “Families Against 
Mikel Knight” was created, allegedly by persons related to the injured and 
deceased independent contractors. (1 AA 10-11 ¶¶ 11-12.) Petitioners claim 
that the Facebook page criticizing Knight and his business practices (and 
later, other similar pages1) was created without his consent, and that the 
pages use his name and likeness without authorization. (1 AA 10 ¶ 11; 1 
AA 15 ¶ 31.) Petitioners also offer conclusory assertions that Facebook 
placed “ads on all the unauthorized Facebook pages.” (1 AA 12-13, 16 ¶¶ 
17-20, 34.) In response to Facebook’s anti-SLAPP motion, however, 
Petitioners submitted evidence showing that, in fact, either no ads appeared 
or unrelated ads (such as credit card and loan refinancing ads) appeared 
                                              
1 By December 2015, the Families Against Mikel Knight page was no 
longer accessible, but other allegedly unauthorized pages—“Jason cross aka 
mikel knight” and “Prove yourself Jason Cross aka Mikel Knight”—were 
created and remained available at the time this lawsuit was filed. (1 AA 15 
¶ 31.) 
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alongside the pages critical of Knight and his company’s business practices. 
(1 AA 155-59.) 
2. Superior Court Proceedings 
On February 16, 2016, Petitioners filed a verified Complaint against 
Facebook,2 alleging six causes of action: (1) breach of written contract; (2) 
negligent misrepresentation; (3) negligent interference with prospective 
economic relations; (4) breach of Civil Code section 3344; (5) violation of 
common law right of publicity; and (6) unlawful and unfair business 
practices, Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL claim).3  
 In response, Facebook filed a demurrer and a special motion to strike 
the Complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil 
Procedure § 425.16. The anti-SLAPP motion demonstrated that Petitioners’ 
Complaint arose from Facebook’s exercise of its constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with an issue of public interest, and that Petitioners 
could not show a probability of success for two reasons: (1) the claims were 
barred by the CDA; and (2) even if not, the claims were not viable under 
California law.  
                                              
2 This was at least the second attempt by Petitioners to sue Facebook. In 
August 2015, a Tennessee court dismissed virtually identical claims on the 
grounds that Facebook, an internet service provider, did not create the 
content at issue and was therefore immune from Knight’s claims under the 
CDA. 
3 Petitioner Knight asserted all six causes of action; Petitioner 1203 
Entertainment joined the third cause of action; and all Petitioners joined as 
to the sixth cause of action. 
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 After a hearing, the superior court issued a six-page order holding 
that Facebook had shown that the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis was 
satisfied because, “i[t] cannot be disputed that Facebook’s website and the 
Facebook pages at issue are ‘public forums,’” and “the content of the 
subject Facebook pages concern public issues or issues of public interest.” 
(1 AA 325.) The court observed that the lawsuit “clearly targets Facebook’s 
ability to maintain a forum for discussion of these issues, including its 
discretion to remove content that Plaintiffs find objectionable.” (Ibid.) 
As to the second step—whether Petitioners had shown a probability 
of success on the merits of their claims—the superior court held that the 
first three claims were barred by the CDA, which provides that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.” (Ibid. [citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)].) The court noted 
that it was undisputed that Facebook is an “interactive computer service,” 
and that the pages to which Plaintiffs objected contained content provided 
by another “information content provider.” (1 AA 327.) As such, the 
superior court concluded, the first three causes of action—for breach of 
contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent interference with 
prospective economic relations—were barred because these causes of 
action “treat[ed] Facebook as the ‘publisher’ . . . of the . . . content” to 
which Plaintiffs object. (Ibid.) The court thus granted the anti-SLAPP 
motion as to those three claims.  
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The superior court went on, however, to hold that Petitioners’ three 
remaining claims—common law and statutory right of publicity, and the 
derivative UCL claims—were not barred by the CDA. (1 AA 328.) 
Pointing to Section 230(e)(2)’s language that “[n]othing in this section shall 
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property,” 
and based on its determination that “the right of publicity protects a form of 
intellectual property,” the court held the CDA inapplicable to such claims. 
(Ibid. [quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 387, 399].) 
The superior court further held that Knight had shown a probability 
of prevailing on his right of publicity claims because he alleged that 
Facebook ran unrelated advertisements adjacent to the “unauthorized” 
pages created by the third parties critiquing Knight and his business 
practices. (Ibid.) According to the court, by allowing unrelated 
advertisements (also created by third parties) to run adjacent to the third-
party-generated content critical of Knight, Facebook “used” Knight’s name 
and likeness in violation of his right of publicity. The superior court 
reached this conclusion even though the ads that appeared adjacent to these 
pages were also created by third parties, did not advertise Facebook’s 
products or services, and were unrelated to, and did not use, Knight’s name 
or likeness. On that basis, the superior court denied Facebook’s anti-SLAPP 
motion and overruled Facebook’s demurrer as to Knight’s right of publicity 
and derivative UCL claims. (1 AA 328-29.) 
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3. Court of Appeal Proceedings 
Both Facebook and Petitioners appealed, and the Court of Appeal 
ordered the appeals consolidated. The Court of Appeal then (1) affirmed the 
superior court’s order granting the motion to strike the first three causes of 
action for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent 
interference with prospective economic relations and (2) reversed the 
superior court’s order denying the motion to strike the right of publicity and 
derivative UCL claims, and instructed the superior court to enter an order 
granting the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety and striking the Complaint. 
(Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190.) 
The Court of Appeal agreed that “Facebook’s website and the 
Facebook pages at issue are ‘public forums’” for purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 199.) Further, the Court of Appeal found that 
Petitioner’s lawsuit involved “an issue of tremendous [public] concern”: 
“the issue involved the danger of trucks on highways driven by sleep-
deprived drivers.” (Id. at p. 200.)  
The Court of Appeal explicitly rejected Petitioners’ argument that 
the speech forming the basis of their claims was not the public statements 
on the pages at issue, but rather, was Facebook’s alleged statements made 
in its Terms and Community Standards. (Ibid.) The Court reasoned that this 
argument was “inconsistent with the actual allegations in their complaint, 
the clear gravamen of which is Knight’s objection to the third-party content 
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on the pages and Facebook’s editorial decisions to not remove them.” 
(Ibid.)  
Second, the Court of Appeal held that Petitioners had failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits on each of their six 
causes of action. With respect to the first three causes of action for breach 
of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent interference with 
prospective economic advantage, the Court of Appeal affirmed the superior 
court’s holding that the CDA barred all three claims. (Id. at pp. 206-07.) 
Once again, the Court specifically rejected Petitioners’ claim that Facebook 
was liable based on its own promises and representations to Knight, rather 
than its editorial decisions to allow third party speech. (Ibid.)  
Despite Petitioners’ claims, the Court of Appeal noted that “‘what 
matters is not the name of the cause of action’; instead, ‘what matters is 
whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.’” 
(Id. at p. 207 [quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 
1096, 1101–1102].) As such, it found that “numerous courts have held the 
CDA bars claims based on a failure to remove content posted by others.” 
(Ibid. [collecting cases].) The Court of Appeal also expressly addressed and 
rejected Petitioners’ “private” promise theory by explaining that 
“[c]contrary to Knight’s assertions, the complaint does not arise from 
‘private’ statements or promises made to Knight in Facebook’s terms” and 
that even if it did, multiple prior courts had rejected similar arguments 
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because “while Facebook’s Terms of Service ‘place restrictions on users’ 
behavior,’ they ‘do not create affirmative obligations’ on Facebook.” (Id. at 
201 [collecting cases].) 
With respect to the right of publicity claims and the derivative UCL 
claim (the last three causes of action), the Court of Appeal reversed the 
superior court’s determination that Petitioners had shown a probability of 
prevailing on these claims based on the allegations that “Facebook ran 
advertisements adjacent to the ‘unauthorized’ pages created by third parties 
critiquing Knight and his business practices.” (Id. at p. 208.) Specifically, 
the Court of Appeal explained that on the record before it, that there was no 
“use” of Knight’s name and likeness by Facebook as required by both the 
statutory and common law right of publicity claims. (Id. at p. 209.) The 
Court observed that:  
 
Nowhere does Knight demonstrate that the advertisements 
appearing next to the pages used his name or likeness, or that 
any of the advertisements were created by, or advertised, 
Facebook. All he claims is that Facebook displayed 
advertisements next to pages created by third parties who 
were using Knight’s name and likeness to critique his 
business practices—and their allegedly fatal consequences. 
While Knight claims that “Facebook continues to place ads 
on all the unauthorized Facebook pages,” he necessarily 
concedes that his name and likeness appear not in the ads 
themselves, but in the content posted to Facebook by third 
parties. This is insufficient. 
(Ibid.; see also id. at p. 209 n.5 [noting further “Knight’s submission of 
excerpts of the unauthorized pages… show only unrelated, sponsored 
content adjacent to the pages”].) 
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 Though Knight’s right of publicity claims failed on that ground 
alone, the Court of Appeal further held that Knight had also failed to 
demonstrate “commercial use” by Facebook because he “ha[d] not even 
alleged—let alone shown—that any advertiser used his name or likeness,” 
and thus could not “establish that anyone, let alone Facebook, obtained an 
advantage through use of his identity.” (Id. at p. 211.) Because the evidence 
demonstrated either that no advertisements appeared alongside the pages at 
issue, or that any advertisements that did appear made no use of Knight’s 
name or likeness, he could not establish “commercial use”: “At most, 
Knight has shown that Facebook allowed unrelated third-party 
advertisements to run adjacent to pages containing users’ comments about 
Knight and his business practices. This is insufficient.” (Ibid.) Having 
found that Knight failed to allege “use,” let alone “commercial use,” the 
Court of Appeal declined to reach the issue of whether the CDA barred the 
right of publicity and derivative UCL claims. (Id. at pp. 211-13.) 
 The Court of Appeal ordered the superior court to enter an order 
granting the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety and striking the Complaint, 
and to hold a hearing to award Facebook its attorney fees under the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 213.) Petitioners did not seek rehearing in the 
Court of Appeal, but filed a Petition for Review on September 18, 2017. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeal analyzed the anti-SLAPP statute, CDA, and 
right of publicity claims in a manner consistent with prior decisions, 
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including decisions of this Court. Those decisions establish that (1) an 
internet service provider’s exercise of editorial discretion over content on a 
matter of public concern qualifies as conduct in furtherance of free speech 
and is therefore covered by California’s anti-SLAPP statute; (2) the CDA 
immunizes internet service providers against any cause of action that 
“inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or 
speaker’ of content provided by another,” (Facebook, supra, 14 
Cal.App.5th at p. 207 [citing Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at pp. 1101-02]); and 
(3) serving unrelated advertisements adjacent to third-party-generated 
content does not qualify as “use” for right of publicity purposes. Thus, 
review by this Court is not “necessary” to “secure uniformity of decisions” 
or to “settle” any issue of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(b)(1).) 
Instead, Petitioners seek this Court’s review on the ground that the 
Court of Appeal’s order was erroneous. To that end, they repeat their 
argument that the courts below misconstrued their claims. But even if that 
were true, which it is not, Petitioners did not file a petition for rehearing or 
call these alleged errors to the Court of Appeal’s attention. As a result, this 
Court must accept the facts as set forth by the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules 
of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2); see also Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc. 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1000 n.2 [“‘As a matter of policy’ this court will not 
consider ‘any issue or any material fact that was omitted from or misstated 
in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, unless the omission or misstatement 
was called to the attention of the Court of Appeal in a petition for 
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rehearing.’”]; MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal 
Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 421 n.4 [declining to address issue 
that was not raised in petition for review, nor given any “meaningful 
discussion” in the opening and reply briefs].). Those facts compel denial of 
the Petition here. 
A. The Court of Appeal Correctly Held that the Anti-SLAPP 
Statute Applies to Each of Knight’s Six Causes of Action 
The Court of Appeal correctly applied the first prong of the anti-
SLAPP statute to all six of Petitioners’ causes of action because they were 
premised on Facebook’s conduct in furtherance of its right of free speech in 
connection with a public issue—specifically, its exercise of editorial 
discretion regarding certain content posted by third parties on its platform. 
Indeed, Petitioners do not argue that review is necessary to settle the 
question of whether Facebook is a public forum or whether the anti-SLAPP 
statute protects the editorial discretion of service providers. Instead, they 
challenge the Court of Appeal’s application of settled law to the facts of 
this case. 
The Court of Appeal held, consistent with established law, that 
Facebook’s decision not to remove the content at issue was an act “in 
furtherance of the… right of petition or free speech.” (Facebook, supra, 14 
Cal.App.5th at p. 202 [citing Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16, subd. (b)(1)].) This 
holding is in line with well-settled law in both the California Courts of 
Appeal and federal courts: “[W]here… an action directly targets the way a 
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content provider chooses to deliver, present, or publish news content on 
matters of public interest, that action is based on conduct in furtherance of 
free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California’s anti-
SLAPP statute.” (Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable 
News Network, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 414, 424–425; see also Hupp 
v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 398, 403 
[plaintiff’s claim that defendant publisher breached its user agreement with 
plaintiff by failing to remove comments made on publisher’s website 
concerning plaintiff dismissed on anti-SLAPP motion]; Kronemyer v. 
Internet Movie Data Base, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 947 [“[T]he 
gravamen of the lawsuit is the content of respondent’s Web site: the 
producer credits for the films at issue…. [T]he listing of credits on 
respondent’s Web site is an act in furtherance of the right of free speech 
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.”].) 
Petitioners do not cite a single contrary case. Instead, they repeat 
their twice-rejected argument that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply 
here because the speech at issue is “Facebook’s own representations and 
statements” made “privately” to Knight in its Terms and Community 
Standards—rather than its exercise of editorial discretion over the allegedly 
objectionable third-party content. (Pet. at 3, 7.) But the Court of Appeal 
explicitly rejected this mischaracterization of the case: “Contrary to 
Knight’s assertions, the complaint does not arise from ‘private’ statements 
or promises made to Knight in Facebook’s terms.” (Facebook, supra, 14 
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Cal.App.5th at p. 201.) Indeed, the Court of Appeal held that Petitioners’ 
argument was “inconsistent with the actual allegations in their complaint” 
and that “the clear gravamen of [the complaint]… is Knight’s objection to 
the third-party content on the pages and Facebook’s editorial decisions to 
not remove them.” (Id. at p. 200.)  
Moreover, the Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s holding 
that Petitioners could not avoid application of the anti-SLAPP statute under 
Section 425.17’s “commercial speech” exemption because they had not 
alleged (nor could they) that Facebook is “primarily engaged in the 
business of selling or leasing goods or services.” (Id. at p. 203.) And 
because the statements at issue were not commercial statements by 
Facebook about its business operations, but rather, “the speech of the third 
parties who created the pages and posted negative comments about 
Knight,” Section 425.17 of the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. (Ibid.) 
Finally, the Court of Appeal determined that, contrary to Petitioners’ 
argument, the language of the Terms and Community Standards preserved 
Facebook’s discretion to remove content that violates its policies—without 
requiring Facebook to take any particular action. (Id. at pp. 203-04.) 
Petitioners did not challenge any of these conclusions through a petition for 
rehearing at the Court of Appeal, and they may not seek review by this 
Court to correct what they now contend was error.  
Further, to the extent Petitioners ask this Court to review “other 
important matters that the California Supreme Court could address,” 
 22   
including whether speech that “seemingly incite[s] violence” should be 
constitutionally protected and what constitutes a “public issue” in the 
context of this “violent speech” (Pet. at 11), they misapprehend the 
standard for review. It is not the policy of the Supreme Court, in lieu of a 
petition for rehearing by the Court of Appeal, “to review issues that are 
dependent upon development of a factual record when those issues have not 
been timely raised in the Court of Appeal or not reached in that court.” 
(People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1205.) Thus, as a matter of 
policy, this Court should decline Petitioners’ request for review of various 
issues that are irrelevant to the gravamen of Petitioners’ complaint, were 
not before the Court of Appeal, were not raised in a request for rehearing, 
and are not the subject of a sufficiently developed factual record. (Cf. Pet. 
at 11.) 
In short, Petitioners fail to identify any issue requiring this Court’s 
review with regard to the Court of Appeal’s application of the anti-SLAPP 
statute here. Petitioners’ Complaint, despite clear case law to the contrary, 
sought to hold Facebook liable for its decisions to allow third parties to post 
speech critical of Petitioners and their business methods to the Facebook 
platform. Petitioners’ efforts to obfuscate the issues aside, each of their 
claims directly implicates Facebook’s protected free speech rights—
namely, its exercise of editorial discretion as to what content it allows on its 
platform. 
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This case is not and was never about whether speech that may incite 
violence is protected or constitutes a matter of public interest. Nor is it 
about whether the anti-SLAPP statute allows Facebook to assert the free 
speech rights of third parties. Rather, where, as here, Facebook’s protected 
editorial discretion is implicated, it is uncontroversial that the anti-SLAPP 
statute applies.4  
B. The Court of Appeal Correctly Held that the CDA Bars the First 
Three Causes of Action 
Petitioners have not and cannot show that this Court’s review of the 
Court of Appeal’s application of CDA immunity to the first three causes of 
action is necessary to secure uniformity of decision or settle an important 
question of law. As with the application of the anti-SLAPP statute, 
Petitioners did not seek rehearing on any alleged error by the Court of 
Appeal, and they present no authority supporting their assertion that the law 
was incorrectly applied to their claims. Further, Petitioners’ argument that 
                                              
4 Petitioners’ claim that Facebook’s use of the anti-SLAPP statute chills 
citizens’ ability to petition for a redress of their grievances, especially 
because they will be on the hook for attorney fees, is a red herring. (Pet. at 
3-4, 9.) Not only do Petitioners’ raise this argument for the first time in this 
Petition, but they misconstrue the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, which 
is to “alleviate SLAPP suits by requiring a plaintiff to reimburse a 
prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extricating himself or herself 
from a baseless lawsuit.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 
448 [citing Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 362].) 
Thus, the Court of Appeal’s order directing the superior court to award 
Facebook its attorney fees was in line with well-established law, and does 
not chill reasonable claims. And to the extent awarding fees chills meritless 
lawsuits, the anti-SLAPP statute is accomplishing its purpose. 
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CDA immunity was created only for “defamation-based liability” is 
demonstrably false. 
The Court of Appeal, in affirming the superior court’s decision, 
correctly held that Petitioners’ first three causes of action against Facebook 
were barred by the CDA because, at bottom, each claim sought to treat 
Facebook as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party content critical of 
Knight and his businesses. The Court specifically rejected Petitioners’ 
argument that these three claims were premised on Facebook’s own 
promises and representations to Knight, rather than third-party speech. 
(Facebook, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) In doing so, the Court of 
Appeal held, in accordance with established law, that “‘what matters is not 
the name of the cause of action’; instead, ‘what matters is whether the cause 
of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the 
‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.’” (Ibid. [quoting 
Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at 1101–02].)  
Indeed, both federal and California state courts are in agreement on 
this principle. (See, e.g., ibid. [“numerous courts have held the CDA bars 
claims based on a failure to remove content posted by others”]; Hupp, 
supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 405 [CDA barred breach of contract claim 
arising from newspaper’s failure to remove comments on website]; Doe II 
v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 573 [CDA barred tort claims 
seeking to hold MySpace liable for “failing to exercise a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions, namely deciding whether to publish certain 
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material or not”]; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 835 
[CDA barred negligence claim based on eBay’s failure to remove or alter 
allegedly fraudulent product descriptions]; Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc. 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1056, 1064-65 [dismissing plaintiff’s 
claims for breach of contract and negligence for Facebook’s decision not to 
remove content, as liability based on that sort of vicarious responsibility is 
what section 230 of the CDA seeks to avoid]; Klayman v. Zuckerberg (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 [CDA barred negligence claim based on 
insufficiently prompt removal of Facebook pages]; Sikhs for Justice 
“SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015) 144 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1094-
95, affd., ___ Fed.App’x ___, 2017 WL 4118358 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017) 
[CDA barred claim alleging that Facebook violated title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by blocking access to plaintiff’s Facebook page in India 
because it sought “to hold Defendant liable for Defendant’s decision 
‘whether to publish’ third-party content”].) 
Petitioners have not pointed to any authority supporting its theory 
limiting the CDA to “defamation-based liability” or calling into doubt the 
CDA’s focus on “whether the cause of action inherently requires the court 
to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by 
another.” (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at pp. 1101–1102.) Indeed, this Court 
has acknowledged that CDA immunity is not limited to defamation claims. 
(See Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 54 [noting that “section 
230(c)… was aimed at protecting against liability for claims such as 
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negligence”].) Once again, Petitioners are simply attempting to get a third 
bite at the apple by claiming, without any basis, that the CDA applies only 
to causes of action for defamation and that their claims are premised on 
Facebook’s conduct with respect to Petitioners, rather than its conduct with 
respect to third party speech on its platform. (Pet. at 4, 14.) 
Because Petitioners identify no conflict among the Courts of Appeal 
nor any important and unsettled question of law, their petition for review 
should be denied. Petitioners desire to quibble with the application of the 
law to the facts is improper. They did not petition the Court of Appeal for 
rehearing, and they therefore may not now argue that the Court of Appeal 
erred by applying well-established law to Petitioners’ formulation of the 
facts of this case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).)  
C. The Court of Appeal Properly Dismissed Petitioners’ Right of 
Publicity and Derivative UCL Claims on the Grounds that 
Knight Failed to Demonstrate Any “Use” of his Name or 
Likeness By Facebook 
Petitioners have not demonstrated the need for this Court’s review of 
the Court of Appeal’s ruling that Knight failed to allege a “use,” let alone a 
“commercial use,” of his name and likeness by Facebook. Again, 
Petitioners do not cite any authority or even argue that there is an unsettled, 
important question of law regarding the Court of Appeal’s application of 
the statutory and common law right of publicity claims to the facts at issue 
in this case.  
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Nor can they. It is well-settled that both statutory and common law 
right of publicity claims require a “use” of the plaintiff’s identity by the 
defendant, which Knight has not and cannot show here. (See, e.g., Montana 
v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 790, 793 [requiring 
“the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity”] [emphasis added] [quoting 
Eastwood v. Superior Court (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 417]; Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Google, Inc. (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010) No. CV 04-9484 AHM SHX, 
2010 WL 9479060, p. *13, affd. (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3d 976) [“P10 has 
not shown that Google is, in fact, inappropriately using the models’ 
likenesses. Because both the statutory and common law versions of a right 
of publicity claim require that the defendant actually use the plaintiff’s 
likeness, P10 has not established that it is likely to prevail on its right of 
publicity claim.”] [citing Fleet v. CBS, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, 
1918].) Indeed, Petitioners’ Complaint alleges that third parties, not 
Facebook, created the content and made the statements about which Knight 
complains. These allegations alone are fatal to his right of publicity claims 
against Facebook.  
Further, it is a matter of well-settled law that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate not only a “use” by the defendant, but a “commercial use” to 
state a claim under the right of publicity statute. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeal held, in line with both state and federal law, that “the statute 
requires some ‘use’ by the advertiser aimed at obtaining a commercial 
advantage for the advertiser.” (Facebook, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 210-
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11 [citing Eastwood, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p.420].) Thus, the Court of 
Appeal reached the uncontroversial conclusion that Knight failed to 
demonstrate “commercial use” by Facebook because he “ha[d] not even 
alleged—let alone shown—that any advertiser used his name or likeness,” 
and thus could not “establish that anyone, let alone Facebook, obtained an 
advantage through use of his identity.” (Id. at p. 211.) The Court of Appeal 
continued that “[a]t most, Knight has shown that Facebook allowed 
unrelated third-party advertisements to run adjacent to pages containing 
users’ comments about Knight and his business practices. This is 
insufficient.” (Id. at. pp. 210-13 [citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co. (9th 
Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 686; Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 
Cal.App.4th 664].) 
Knight ignores his inability to demonstrate “use” or “commercial 
use” by Facebook, and merely hypothesizes that because the pages and 
comments critical of him appeared on Facebook, a “use” by Facebook must 
have occurred and that this “use” must have been “knowing.” (See Pet. at 
16.) He similarly suggests that “clarification on the meaning of use ‘in any 
manner … for the purposes of advertising” would be helpful. (See Pet. at 
17). 
Not only are these issues alleged errors that should have been raised 
in a motion for reconsideration but were not, Knight’s entire discussion of 
whether a use was “knowing” or occurred “in any manner” are red herrings. 
In addition, they are based on speculation about instances in which 
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“knowing use” could occur5 in online advertising or what “in any manner” 
may mean (see Pet. at 16), but such speculation does not provide a basis for 
review by this Court, because this issue was never presented to the Court of 
Appeal. (Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1205 [“Further, it is our policy not 
to review issues that are dependent upon development of a factual record 
when those issues have not been timely raised in the Court of Appeal or not 
reached in that court, when the latter omission was not brought to the 
attention of the Court of Appeal by petition for rehearing.”] [citing Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)].) Indeed, the record in the superior court is 
devoid of any evidence to explain Knight’s suppositions as to how 
Facebook advertising operates.  
Moreover, regardless of the advertising technology involved, “a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for commercial purposes, and there must be a direct connection 
between the defendant’s use of the likeness and that commercial purpose.” 
(Perfect 10, supra, 2010 WL 9479060 at p. *13 [rejecting theory in the 
context of online advertising that Google was “materially contributing” to 
violation of publicity rights by providing advertising alongside use of 
models’ likeness].) And no such evidence exists here. 
                                              
5 The Petition speculates, without support, that “‘[k]nowing use’ could 
occur when a person of the organization… directly views the content that 
has been posted” or “when an algorithm or internal technological program 
detects the specific content or image that has been posted on the site and 
aligns related advertising accordingly.” (Pet. at 16.) 
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In sum, Knight has identified no basis to review the Court of 
Appeals sound analysis of his right of publicity claims.  
D. Review of Issues Not Presented in the Court of Appeal is Neither 
Proper Nor Warranted  
Finally, Petitioners’ argument that review of each of the six causes 
of action is warranted in light of the “modern context of interactive 
computer services and internet advertising” fares no better. (Pet. at 18-20.) 
As with the other issues contained in the Petition, Petitioners did not ask the 
Court of Appeal to correct any error or identify any issue that Court of 
Appeal failed to address. Petitioner’s characterization of the “modern 
context of interactive computer services and internet advertising” is 
unsupported by any analysis and is nothing more than wishful thinking. 
Neither interactive computer services nor internet advertising are new. 
Interactive computer services have been around for decades, as evidenced 
by Congress’s use of that term when passing the CDA in 1996. (See 47 
U.S.C. §230). Further, Petitioners’ perceived issues relating to “modern 
internet advertising” are unsupported in the record and untethered to the 
allegations in their Complaint.  
Moreover, the crux of Knight’s right of publicity claims has nothing 
to do with the issue of online advertising technology. Rather, it seeks to 
create liability based solely on the presence of unrelated ads appearing 
adjacent to user generated content that use Knight’s name or likeness in a 
manner he does not like. The Court of Appeal faithfully applied well-
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established principles of law and devoted more than six pages of its opinion 
to explain that Knight had failed to demonstrate any cognizable use of his 
name or likeness by Facebook, let alone any commercial use for purposes 
of advertising by anyone. (Facebook, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 206-13.) 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Review should be denied. 
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